Assuming that agents' preferences satisfy first-order stochastic dominance, we show how the Expected Utility paradigm can rationalize all optimal investment choices: the optimal investment strategy in any behavioral law-invariant (state-independent) setting corresponds to the optimum for an expected utility maximizer with an explicitly derived concave non-decreasing utility function. This result enables us to infer the utility and risk aversion of agents from their investment choice in a non-parametric way. We relate the property of decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) to distributional properties of the terminal wealth and of the financial market. Specifically, we show that DARA is equivalent to a demand for a terminal wealth that has more spread than the opposite of the log pricing kernel at the investment horizon.
Introduction
First suggested by Bernoulli (1738) and rigorously introduced in the economic literature by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) , Expected Utility Theory (EUT) has for decades been the dominant theory for making decisions under risk. Nonetheless, this framework has been criticized for not always being consistent with agents' observed behavior (e.g., the paradox of Allais (1953) , Starmer (2000) ).
In response to this criticism, numerous alternatives have been proposed, most notably dual theory (Yaari (1987) ), rank-dependent utility theory (Quiggin (1993) ) and cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman (1992) ). These competing theories differ significantly, but all three typically satisfy first-order stochastic dominance (FSD). Indeed, many economists consider violation of this property as grounds for refuting a particular model; see for example Birnbaum (1997) , Birnbaum and Navarrette (1998) , and Levy (2008) for empirical evidence of FSD violations. Recall also that although the original prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) provides explanations for previously unexplained phenomena, it violates FSD. To overcome this potential drawback, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) developed cumulative prospect theory.
In the presence of a continuum of states, we show that the optimal portfolio in any behavioral theory that respects FSD can be rationalized by the expected utility setting, i.e., it is the optimal portfolio for an expected utility maximizer with an explicitly known concave utility function. This implied utility function is unique up to a linear transformation among concave functions and can thus be used for further analyses of preferences, such as to infer the risk aversion of investors.
A surprising feature is that we only assume that the preferences respect FSD, which contrasts to earlier results on the rationalization of investment choice under expected utility theory. Dybvig ((1988a) , Appendix A), Peleg and Yaari (1975) and Zilcha and Chew (1990) , among others, have worked on this problem assuming that preferences preserve second-order stochastic dominance (SSD). However, being SSD-preserving is quite a strong assumption, and while consistency with FSD is inherent, and even enforced, in most decision theories, this is not readily the case for SSD. For instance, rank dependent utility theory satisfies FSD but not SSD (Chew, Karni and Safra (1987) , Ryan (2006) ), and the same holds true for cumulative prospect theory (see e.g., Baucells and Heukamp (2006) ). Thus, our results show that for any agent behaving according to the cumulative prospect theory (i.e., for a "CPT investor") there is a corresponding expected utility maximizer with concave utility purchasing the same optimal portfolio, even if the CPT investor can exhibit risk seeking behavior with respect to losses. This approach, however, is not intended to dispense with alternative models to expected utility theory, as they have been developed mainly to compare gambles and not to deal with optimal portfolio selection per se.
Our results are rooted in the basic insight that under some assumptions, the marginal utility at a given consumption level is proportional to the ratio of risk-neutral probabilities and physical probabilities (Nau and Mccardle (1991) , Duffie (2010) , Pennacchi (2008) ). At first, it then seems obvious to infer a (concave) utility function and the risk aversion from the optimal consumption of the investor. However, the characterization that the marginal utility is proportional to the pricing kernel at a given consumption level is valid only if the utility is differentiable at this consumption level. This observation renders the rationalization of investment choices by the expected utility theory non-trivial, as there are many portfolios for which the implied utility is not differentiable at all consumption levels, such as the purchase of options or capital guarantee products. Furthermore, in a discrete setting (with a finite number of equiprobable states) there are many utility functions that are consistent with optimal consumption. In this context, Peleg and Yaari (1975) give one potential implied utility, but there are many others. In the presence of a continuum of states, when the pricing kernel is continuously distributed, we are able to derive the unique (up to a linear transformation) concave utility function that is implied by the optimal consumption of any investor who respects FSD.
The proof of our main results builds on Dybvig's (1988a Dybvig's ( , 1988b seminal work on portfolio selection.
Instead of optimizing a value function, Dybvig (1988a) specifies a target distribution and solves for the strategy that generates the distribution at the lowest possible cost. 1 Our results are also related to earlier work on revealed preferences by Afriat (1972) and Varian (1982 Varian ( , 2006 , whose analyses aim at understanding the preferences of a consumer who has to choose among bundles of goods, given a budget constraint. Their original problem can be formulated as follows. Given a set of observations of prices and quantities for a finite number of goods observed over some period of time, is it possible to find a utility function that rationalizes the observed portfolio choices? That is, at any time t, the utility obtained by the portfolio of goods (observed at time t) is at least as good as any other available portfolio at time t for this utility. If the set of observed price-quantity pairs satisfies some inequalities (called cyclical consistency), Afriat (1972) proves the existence of an increasing, continuous and concave utility
function. Here, we analyze the idea of inferring preferences for consumers who are investing in the financial market. We show that if their portfolio satisfies some conditions, then it can be rationalized by expected utility theory with a non-decreasing and concave function. Although our analysis appears to be a natural extension (see Theorem 3 and Remark 2), it differs fundamentally from Afriat's work in a few aspects. First, Afriat (1972) , Varian (1982 Varian ( , 2006 and most of the subsequent work on revealed preferences has been done in a "certainty" framework (utility setting), whereas, in the financial market, the future consumption for each unit invested is unknown (expected utility setting). Secondly, Afriat's (1972) approach relies on an ex-post analysis of a sequence of observed consumptions in time, whereas our analysis studies the ex-ante properties of a future consumption bundle in a one-period setting.
Finally, we assume that there is an infinite number of states in which it is possible to invest, whereas the analyses of Afriat (1972) and Varian (1982 Varian ( , 2006 are formulated with a finite number of states.
The assumption that we make is natural in the context of optimal portfolio selection problems. It allows to obtain the uniqueness of the implied concave utility and to be able to use this inferred utility to estimate risk aversion, for instance.
Inference of risk preferences from observed investment behavior has also been studied by Sharpe (2007) , Sharpe, Goldstein and Blythe (2000) , Dybvig and Rogers (1997) and Musiela and Zariphopoulos (2010) . 2 Sharpe (2007) and Sharpe et al. (2000) assume a static setting and rely on Dybvig's (1988b) results to estimate the coefficient of constant relative risk aversion for a CRRA utility based on target distributions of final wealth.
In this paper, we establish a link between expected utility theory (EUT) and all other theories that 1 It may indeed be more natural for an investor to describe her target distribution of terminal wealth instead of her utility function. For example, Goldstein, Johnson and Sharpe (2008) discuss how to estimate the distribution at retirement using a questionnaire. The pioneering work in portfolio selection by Markowitz (1952) and Roy (1952) is based solely on the mean and variance of returns and does not invoke utility functions. Black (1988) calls a utility function "a foreign concept for most individuals" and states that "instead of specifying his preferences among various gambles the individual can specify his consumption function".
2 Under some conditions, Dybvig and Rogers (1997) and Musiela and Zariphopoulos (2010) infer utility from dynamic investment decisions. Our setting is static and well adapted to the investment practice by which consumers purchase a financial contract and do not trade afterwards.
respects FSD. This connection can be used to estimate the agents' utility functions and risk aversion coefficients in a non-expected utility setting. Our approach in doing so is non-parametric and is based solely on knowledge of the distribution of optimal wealth and of the financial market. This is in contrast to traditional approaches to inferring utility and risk aversion, which specify an exogenous parametric utility function in isolation of the market in which the agent invests and then calibrate this utility function using laboratory experiments and econometric analysis of panel data.
It is widely accepted that the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion is decreasing with wealth. This feature -i.e., decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) -is often the motivation for using the CRRA utility instead of the exponential utility to model investors' preferences. In this paper, we show that the DARA property is completely characterized by a demand for final wealth W that exhibits more spread than a certain market variable (which we define in a precise sense in the paper).
Our characterization of DARA can be used to empirically test DARA preferences based on observed investment decisions.
Introductory Example
Throughout this paper, we consider agents with law-invariant and non-decreasing preferences, 3 V (·).
We say that V (·) is non-decreasing if, for consumptions X and Y satisfying X Y , one has that
, where "∼" reflects equality in distribution. This is often referred as a "state-independent" set of preferences. We also assume that the agent's initial budget is finite.
In this section, we present an example in order to introduce the notation and to explain in a simplified setting (a space with a finite number of equal probable states) why a distribution of terminal wealth can always be obtained as the optimum of the maximization of expected utility for a risk averse agent. We will also show the limitations of this discrete setting and how it fails to identify the implied concave utility function and implied risk aversion of the investor.
The introductory example takes place in a finite state space Ω = {ω 1 , ω 2 , ..., ω N } consisting of N equiprobable states (with probability 1 N ) at some terminal time T . Denote by ξ(ω i ) N the initial (positive) cost at time 0 of the Arrow-Debreu security that pays one unit in the i th state, ω i , at time T and zero otherwise. Let us call ξ := (ξ 1 , ξ 2 , ..., ξ N ) the pricing kernel where ξ i := ξ(ω i ). It is clear that any state-contingent consumption X := (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x N ) (with x i := X(ω i )) at time T writes as a linear combination of the N Arrow-Debreu securities.
The optimal investment problem of the agent with preferences V (·) is to find the optimal consumption X * by solving the optimization problem,
where the budget constraint
ξ i x i = X 0 reflects that the agent's initial wealth level is X 0 . We assume that an optimum X * to Problem (1) exists (it is always the case when restricting to non-negative consumptions). Denote by x * i := X * (ω i ). Observe then that X * and ξ must be anti-monotonic 4 ; in other words, the outcomes for X * are ordered in reverse of the ones for ξ, or
Let us prove (2) by contradiction. To this end, assume that there exist two states, ω i and ω j , such that
Since all states are equiprobable, X ∼ Y implies that V (X) = V (Y ) by the law-invariance of V (·). However, Y has a strictly lower cost, i.e.,
Hence, X * cannot be optimal as
Without loss of generality, using (2), we can thus assume that x * 1 x * 2 ... x * N and ξ 1 ξ 2 ... ξ N . For ease of exposition, we suppose in addition that the inequalities are strict (see Peleg and Yaari (1975) for the most general case):
Proposition 1 (Rationalizing Investment in a Discrete Setting). The optimal solution of (1), denoted by X * also solves the maximum expected utility problem
for any concave utility U (·) such that the left derivative 5 denoted by U ′ exists in x * i for all i and satisfies
The proof of Proposition 1 given in Appendix A.1 uses the concavity of U and is a basic application of pathwise optimization. It is clear from Proposition 1 that the utility function U (·) that rationalizes the optimal investment choice X * in this setting is not unique. The candidate utility U P (·) proposed by Peleg and Yaari (1975) is given by
where v(y) = ξ 1 −y+x * 1 for y < x * 1 and v(y) = ξ j +(y−x * j )
is differentiable at all x * i and satisfies the condition U ′ P (x * i ) = ξ i of Proposition 1. It will be clear later that if we use this utility and generalize the financial market to have a continuum of states, then X * no longer solves (3). In this paper, we introduce 6 a utility function U (·)
where F (·) is the distribution function (cdf) of X * , F ξ (·) is the cdf of ξ and the quantile function
p} with the convention that F −1
) is a decreasing right-continuous step function (taking the value ξ 1 for y < x * 1 , ξ i+1 when y ∈ [x * i , x * i+1 ) for i = 1, ..., N − 1, and the value 0 for y x * N ). Thus, U (·) is continuous, piecewise linear and concave satisfying U (x * 1 ) = 0. It is differentiable at all points except at each x * i , i = 1, 2, ..., N , where it has a distinct right and left derivative. Denote by U ′ (·) the left derivative of U (·). We have that condition (4) of Proposition 1 is satisfied. Moreover, Theorem 4 will show that it is the unique (generalized) utility that explains the demand for X * in the market when ξ is continuously distributed.
Henceforth, we assume that the state price ξ is continuously distributed, and we extend the above construction to the more general market (infinite state space) in Section 4. Doing so is not only a technical extension, but rather natural in the context of making optimal investment choices and at least consistent with the literature on it. As the example illustrates, it is also necessary in order to define the utility function (up to a linear transformation) that rationalizes the demand for a given optimal consumption X * , and that can thus be used to compute the implied risk aversion of the investor.
When requiring that the utility function is differentiable at all points, we will show that we can only explain continuous distributions. However, there are many situations in which the investor wants a discrete distribution of wealth or a mixed distribution. He and Zhou (2011) show that, under some assumptions, optimal payoffs in Yaari's dual theory have a discrete distribution, whereas in the case of cumulative prospect theory, the optimal final wealth has a mixed distribution. While these observations point to differences between the decision theories, we show that these optimal payoffs can be rationalized by (generalized) expected utility theory. Section 5 provides some applications of the results derived in Section 4. In particular, we illustrate how a non-decreasing concave utility function can be constructed to explain the demand for optimal investment in Yaari's (1987) setting. One of the key findings presented toward the end of the paper (Section 6) is to infer risk aversion and to show that DARA is equivalent to a demand for terminal wealth that exhibits more spread than the market variable H T := − log(ξ T ).
Setting
We assume an arbitrage-free and frictionless financial market (Ω, F, P) with a fixed investment horizon of T > 0. Let ξ T be the pricing kernel that is agreed upon by all agents. We assume that it has a positive density on R + \{0}. The value X 0 at time 0 of a consumption X T at T is then computed as
We consider only terminal consumptions X T such that X 0 is finite. Throughout the paper, agents have law-invariant and non-decreasing preferences V (·). Theorem 1 shows that these properties are equivalent to preferences V (·) that respect FSD. X ≺ f sd Y means that Y is (first-order) stochastically larger than X, i.e., for all x ∈ R, The proof of Theorem 1 can be found in Appendix A.2. An agent with preferences V (·) finds her optimal terminal consumption X * T by solving the following optimization problem:
When an optimal strategy X * T exists, denote its cdf by F * . Intuitively, since V (·) is non-decreasing and law-invariant, then among all strategies with cdf F , the optimum X * T must be the cheapest possible one. This observation is made precise in the following lemma, which is instrumental to the rest of the paper. We omit the proof, as it is proved in Bernard, Boyle and Vanduffel (2014) . 7 Lemma 1 (Cost-efficiency). Assume that an optimum X * T of (6) exists and denote its cdf by F . Then, X * T is the cheapest (cost-efficient) way to achieve the distribution F at the investment horizon T , i.e., X * T also solves the following problem:
Furthermore, for any given cdf F , the solution X ⋆ T to Problem (7) is almost surely (a.s.) unique and writes as
. Payoffs are cost-efficient if and only if they are non-increasing in the pricing kernel ξ T .
Lemma 1 provides us with an alternative approach to portfolio optimization. Usually, one resorts to a value function V (·) in order to model preferences and then finds the optimal consumption by solving Problem (6). Using Lemma 1, one specifies a desired distribution F of terminal wealth up-front 8 and determines the cheapest strategy that is distributed with F .
In general, there may be more than one solution to (6). However, two different solutions must have different cdfs because the cost-efficient payoff generating a given distribution is unique. In the context of EUT, V (X T ) = E(U (X T )) for some utility function U (·). When U (·) is not concave, a standard approach to solving Problem (6) is to introduce the concave envelope of U (·), denoted by U C (·), which is the smallest concave function larger than or equal to U (·). Reichlin (2013) shows that under some technical assumptions, the maximizer for U C (·) is also the maximizer for U (·). However, this maximizer is only unique under certain cases (see Lemma 5.9 of Reichlin (2013)).
In the following section, we reconcile different decision theories by showing that an optimal portfolio in any behavioral theory that respects FSD can be obtained as an optimal portfolio for a risk averse investor maximizing a (generalized) expected utility.
7 The first part of the lemma corresponds to their Proposition 5. The second part corresponds to their Proposition 2 and Corollary 2. It is also closely related to results that first appeared in Dybvig (1988a Dybvig ( , 1988b .
8 As aforementioned, it is presumably easier for many investors to describe a target terminal wealth distribution F than to articulate the value function V (·) governing their investment decision (see e.g., Goldstein, Johnson and Sharpe (2008)).
Explaining Distributions through Expected Utility Theory
In the first part of this section, we show how the traditional expected utility setting with a strictly increasing and strictly concave utility function on an interval can be used to explain F when it is strictly increasing and continuous on this interval. The second part shows that, more generally, any distribution of optimal final wealth can be explained using a "generalized" utility function defined over R. Since a solution X * T to the optimization problem (6) is completely characterized by its distribution F , it follows that X * T is also optimal for some expected utility maximizer. The last part discusses tests for verifying whether investor behavior can be rationalized by the (generalized) Expected Utility Theory.
Standard Expected Utility Maximization
tiable, strictly increasing on (a, b), U ′ is strictly decreasing on (a, b) (so that the investor is risk averse),
Note that Inada's conditions correspond to a = c = 0 and b = +∞.
Definition 2 (Rationalization by Standard Expected Utility Theory
). An optimal portfolio choice X * T with a finite budget X 0 is rationalizable by the standard expected utility theory if there exists a utility function U ∈ U (a,b) such that X * T is also the optimal solution to
The following lemma finds the optimal payoff for an expected utility maximizer with a utility
The (a.s.) unique optimal solution X ⋆ T to the expected utility maximization (8) is given by
where
This lemma is proved by Merton (1971) and by Cox and Huang (1989) when Inada's conditions are satisfied. Note in particular that in the statement of the lemma, the condition on the budget automatically disappears when Inada's conditions are satisfied. The result is presented here in a slightly more general setting, as it will be needed in what follows. The proof of this lemma (given in Appendix A.3) illustrates how the pathwise optimization technique (used repeatedly throughout the paper) can help to solve the standard expected utility maximization (8). The following theorem gives, for any strictly increasing continuous distribution of final wealth, an explicit construction of the utility function that explains the investor's demand in the expected utility maximization framework.
Theorem 2 (Strictly increasing continuous distribution). Consider a strictly increasing and continuous cdf F on (a, b) ⊂ R with a, b ∈ R. Assume that the cost of the unique cost-efficient payoff X ⋆ T solving (7) is finite and denote it by X 0 . Then X ⋆ T is also the optimal solution of the expected utility maximization problem (8) with the following explicit utility function U ∈ U (a,b)
for some c such that F (c) > 0. This utility U is unique in U (a,b) up to a linear transformation.
Proof. When U (·) satisfies the conditions of Lemma 2, the optimal solution to (8) can be written as
Lemma 2). From Lemma 1, the unique cost-efficient payoff with cdf F has the following expression
The utility function U (·) as defined in (9) is constructed to equate (10) and (11). Specifically, using the properties of continuity and increasingness of F ξ T , U (·) belongs to U (a,b) and thus satisfies all conditions of Lemma 2: it is continuously differentiable on (a, b) and for
is strictly increasing and U ′ (·) is strictly decreasing on (a, b). Note also that U (c) = 0, the limit of U ′ (x) is +∞ when x ց a and the limit of U ′ (x) is 0 when x ր b because of F −1 ξ T
(1) = +∞ and
Observe that for λ ⋆ = 1, X ⋆ T ∼ F . By assumption, X 0 is the cost of the unique cost-efficient payoff with distribution F . Therefore,
thus the solution to the maximum expected utility problem (8). If there is another utility U 2 ∈ U (a,b) such that X * T is an optimal solution to (8), then, by the same reasoning as above, we find that
for all x ∈ (a, b), and thus U 2 can be obtained in terms of a linear transformation of U .
If an expected utility maximizer chooses a particular investment with distribution of terminal wealth F , then the only utility function in U (a,b) that rationalizes her choice is given by (9) (up to a linear transformation). Note also that this utility function (9) involves properties of the financial market at the horizon time T (through the cdf F ξ T of the pricing kernel ξ T ).
In the second part of this section, we generalize Theorem 2 to include more general distributions (discrete and mixed distributions). Obviously, any distribution F can always be approximated by a sequence of continuous strictly increasing distributions, F n . Then, for each F n , Theorem 2 allows us to obtain the corresponding strictly concave and strictly increasing utility function U n ∈ U (a,b) so that the optimal investment for an expected utility maximizer with utility function U n is distributed with the cdf F n . Thus, Theorem 2 already explains approximately the demand for all distributions.
Rationalization by Standard Expected Utility Theory
To summarize our findings in this section, we formulate the following characterization of consumptions that can be rationalizable by standard expected utility theory.
Theorem 3 (Rationalizable consumption by Standard EUT). Consider a terminal consumption X T at time T purchased with an initial budget X 0 and distributed with a continuous cdf F . The eight following conditions are equivalent:
(i) X T is rationalizable by standard Expected Utility Theory.
(ii) X T is cost-efficient with cdf F .
(vi) X T is the solution to a maximum portfolio problem for some objective V (·) that satisfies FSD.
(vii) X T is the solution to a maximum portfolio problem for some law-invariant and non-decreasing objective function V (·).
(viii) X T is the solution to a maximum portfolio problem for some objective V (·) that satisfies SSD.
Note that Theorem 3 highlights the strong link between the concept of "cost-efficiency" and "ra- then it satisfies FSD so that (viii) implies (vi) trivially. Our results show that the converse is true and thus that for the rationalization of consumption by Expected Utility Theory it is only required that preferences satisfy FSD, which, unlike the case of SSD, is an assumption that is postulated by most common decision theories.
Remark 1. Theorem 3 cannot be generalized in a discrete setting when the states are not equiprobable as (vi) is not equivalent to (i). 9 For example, take Ω = {ω 1 , ω 2 } with P (ω 1 ) = 1 3 and P (ω 2 ) = 2 3 , and ξ 1 = 3 4 and ξ 2 = 9 8 . Take a budget X 0 = 1 and consider X with X(ω 1 ) = a 1 and X(ω 2 ) = a 2 satisfying the budget condition a 1 4 + 3a 2 4 = 1. Let the objective be defined as V (X) := V aR
is clearly law-invariant and non-decreasing. Thus, V (·) satisfies FSD. It is clear that V (·) is maximized for X * defined through X * (ω 1 ) = 0 and X * (ω 2 ) = 4 3 . By contrast, we can show that X * is never optimal for an expected utility maximizer with non-decreasing concave utility U on [0, , and thus U ( The equivalence of (vii) and (viii) shows that Afriat's (1972) theory shares a similar idea, as explained in the following remark.
Remark 2. Consider observations of prices and quantities for a given set of goods over some period of time (t = 1, 2, ..., n). At time t, one observes a vector of prices p t = (p 1 t , ..., p n t ) for n goods as well as the respective quantities of each good purchased q t = (q 1 t , ..., q n t ). Afriat (1972) aims at finding a utility function u such that at any time t,
where u(q) is to be understood as the utility of consuming q. Note that p t t · q t is the price of the consumption bundle q t and the constraint p t t · q p t t · q t reflects the fact that q was also an available consumption at time t. Under some conditions (called cyclical consistency), Afriat (1972) proves the existence of a strictly increasing, continuous and concave function. In his recent review on revealed preferences, Vermeulen (2012) explains that a "violation of cyclical consistency implies that a consumption bundle that is revealed [as] preferred to some other bundle is strictly less expensive than [the] other bundle. Nevertheless, the consumer has chosen the revealed worse and more expensive bundle, which implies that this consumer violates the utility maximization hypothesis". We observe that our condition for a terminal consumption (portfolio) to be an optimum for an expected utility maximizer is also related directly to its cost and to the fact that it is the cheapest consumption with that distribution (cost-efficient consumption).
Theorem 3 can be used to test whether or not an observed demand for a terminal consumption can be rationalized by expected utility theory. Assume that an investor chooses to invest his initial budget X 0 from 0 to time T in such a way that he is generating a payoff X T at time T . A simple test to investigate whether this investment choice is rationalizable by Expected Utility Theory consists in checking conditions (ii) or (iii) of the theorem. This idea corresponds to the steps taken by Amin and Kat (2003) to determine in another context whether a hedge fund is efficient. 10 Note that this test is based only on the cost of the payoff. If the distribution of returns is not obtained in the cheapest way, it may be caused by an optimal investment criterion that does not satisfy FSD. This is also a potential explanation for the pricing kernel puzzle (Brown and Jackwerth (2004) , Hens and Reichlin (2013) ).
Generalized Expected Utility Maximization
In the previous section, we used cost-efficiency to construct a utility function that is continuously differentiable, strictly concave and strictly increasing on an interval (a, b) with a, b ∈ R to explain the demand for continuous and strictly increasing distributions on (a, b). The same approach can be used to construct a "generalized" utility function defined on the entire real line R, which explains the demand for any distribution. A generalized utility function does not need to be either differentiable on (a, b) or strictly concave. It is formally defined as follows.
Definition 3 ( U (a,b) : set of generalized utility functions). Let (a, b) ⊂ R. We say that U : R → R belongs to the set of generalized utility functions U (a,b) if U (x) writes as
where U : (a, b) → R is strictly increasing and concave on (a, b). We then define U ′ (with abuse of notation) on R as follows. On (a, b), U ′ denotes the left derivative of U . For x < a, U ′ (x) := +∞. Definition 4 (Rationalization by Generalized Expected Utility Theory). An optimal portfolio choice X * T with a finite budget X 0 is rationalizable by the generalized standard expected utility theory if there exists a utility function U ∈ U (a,b) such that X * T is also the optimal solution to
The following lemma finds the optimal payoff for a generalized expected utility maximizer with a utility function in U (a,b) .
Lemma 3. Consider a generalized utility function U of U (a,b) . Assume that
The optimal solution X ⋆ T to the generalized expected utility maximization (12) exists, is a.s. unique and is given by
where U ′ is as defined in Definition 3 and where
with the convention that inf{∅} = b. Furthermore, X ⋆ T has potential mass points.
Lemma 3 is proved in Appendix A.5 and allows us to derive a unique implied generalized expected utility to rationalize the demand for any distribution.
Theorem 4. Let F be a distribution. Let X ⋆ T be the optimal solution to (7) for the cdf F . Denote its cost by X 0 and assume that it is finite: then X ⋆ T is also the optimal solution to Problem (12) where U : R → R is a generalized utility function defined as
with some c a such that F (c) > 0. Conventions:
(+∞)dy = +∞, and
(+∞)dy = −∞ and
g(y) = 0 for all g valued inR. U (·) is unique in the class of generalized utilities up to a linear transformation.
Rationalization by Generalized Expected Utility Theory
We can summarize our findings in this section by the following theorem, which is similar to Theorem 3 but now includes all possible distributions of final wealth.
Theorem 5. Consider a terminal consumption X T at time T purchased with an initial budget X 0 and distributed with F . The following eight conditions are equivalent:
(i) X T is rationalizable by Generalized Expected Utility Theory.
(ii) X T is cost-efficient.
The proof of this theorem is identical to that of Theorem 3 by replacing expected utility with generalized expected utility and is thus omitted.
From Distributions to Utility Functions
In this section, we use the results of the previous sections to derive utility functions that explain the demand for some financial products and for some distributions of final wealth for agents with preferences satisfying FSD. Let us start with a simple example showing how one can recover the popular CRRA utility function from a lognormally distributed final wealth. This example is particularly useful when explaining the optimal demand for a retail investor who chooses an equity-linked structured product with capital guarantee. The last example deals with an example of non-expected utility: Yaari's dual theory of choice. In this case, we are able to exhibit the non-decreasing concave utility function such that the optimal strategy in Yaari's (1987) theory is also obtained in an expected utility maximization framework.
For ease of exposition, we restrict ourselves to the one-dimensional Black-Scholes model with one risky asset, S T . 11 In this case, the pricing kernel ξ T is unique and can be expressed explicitly in terms of the stock price S T as follows:
σ . Formula (15) is well-known and can be found for example in Section 3.3 of . It follows that
11 All developments can be executed in the general market setting given in Section 3. However, closed-form solutions are more complicated or unavailable.
Assume first that consumption is restricted on (0, ∞) and that the investor wants to achieve a lognormal distribution LN (M, Σ 2 ) at maturity T of her investment. The desired cdf is F (x) = Φ ln x−M Σ , and from (15) it follows that F
. Applying Theorem 2, the utility function explaining this distribution writes as
where a = exp(
). This is a CRRA utility function with relative risk aversion θ √ T Σ . A more thorough treatment of risk aversion is provided in Section 6.
Explaining the Demand for Capital Guarantee Products
Many structured products include a capital guarantee and have a payoff of the form Y T = max(G, S T ), where S T is the stock price and K is the (deterministic) guaranteed level. S T has a lognormal dis-
T so that the cdf for Y T is equal to
. Since Y T has a mixed distribution (with mass point at K), we can apply Theorem 4 to derive the corresponding utility function. Let p := Φ
and define the following discrete and continuous cdfs:
Then, we can see that
The utility function U belongs to U (K,∞) and is given by
with a = exp(
2 ). The mass point is explained by a utility that is infinitely negative for any level of wealth below the guaranteed level. The CRRA utility above this guaranteed level ensures the optimality of a lognormal distribution above the guarantee, as aforementioned.
Yaari's Dual Theory of Choice Model
Optimal portfolio selection under Yaari's (1987) dual theory involves maximizing the expected value of the terminal payoff under a distorted probability function. Specifically, under Yaari's dual theory of choice, decision makers evaluate the "utility" of their non-negative final wealth X T (with cdf F ) by calculating its distorted expectation H w [X T ] :
where the (distortion) function w : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is non-decreasing with w(0) = 0 and w(1) = 1.
The investor's initial endowment is X 0 0. He and Zhou (2011) find the optimal payoff when the distortion function is given by w(z) = z γ where γ > 1. They show that there exists 12 c such that the optimal payoff is equal to
> 0 is chosen such that the budget constraint E[ξ T X ⋆ T ] = X 0 is fulfilled. The corresponding cdf is
We find that the utility function U ∈ U (0,B) is given by
The utility function such that the optimal investment in the expected utility setting is similar to the optimum in Yaari's framework (1987) is simply linear up to a maximum c(B − c) and then constant thereafter.
From Distributions to Risk Aversion
In this section, we compute risk aversion directly from the choice of the distribution desired by the investor and from the distribution of the log pricing kernel. We then show that it coincides with the Arrow-Pratt measures for risk aversion when the distribution is continuous. Next, we show that decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) is equivalent to terminal wealth exhibiting a spread greater than the market variable H T := − log(ξ T ). In a Black-Scholes setting, agents thus have DARA preferences if and only if they show a demand for distributions with tails that are "fatter than normal".
Our characterization for DARA also allows us to construct an empirical test for DARA preferences that is based on observed investor behavior.
For ease of exposition, we assume that all distributions in this section are twice differentiable. We denote by G the cdf of H T and by g its density, and we assume that g(x) > 0 for all x ∈ R.
Risk Aversion Coefficient
Definition 5 (Distributional Risk Aversion Coefficient). Let F be the distribution desired by the investor. Let G and g be the cdf and density of − log(ξ T ), respectively. Consider a level of wealth x such 12 It is proved that c is the unique root on 1, γe
. that x = F −1 (p) for some 0 < p < 1. We define the absolute and relative risk aversion at x as
when this limit exists. If F is differentiable at y, then f (y) = F ′ (y). If F has a density, then
Recall that the Arrow-Pratt measures for absolute and relative risk aversion, A(x) resp. R(x), can be computed from a twice differentiable utility function U as A(
Theorem 6 (Arrow-Pratt measures for risk aversion). Consider an investor who targets a cdf F for his terminal wealth (with corresponding f defined as (25)). Consider a level of wealth x in the interior of the support of the distribution F . Then x = F −1 (p) for some 0 < p < 1. The Arrow-Pratt measures for absolute and relative risk aversion at x are given, respectively, as
The proof of Theorem 6 is given in Appendix A.7. Expression (26) shows that the coefficient for absolute risk aversion can be interpreted as a likelihood ratio and is linked directly to the financial market (through the cdf G of the negative of the log pricing kernel H T ).
Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion
We provide precise characterizations of DARA in terms of distributional properties of the final wealth and of the financial market. In what follows, we only consider distributions that are twice differentiable.
Theorem 7 (Distributional characterization of DARA). Consider an investor who targets some distribution F for his terminal wealth. The investor has (strictly) decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) if and only if
The investor has asymptotic DARA (DARA for a sufficiently high level of wealth) if and only if there exists y ⋆ ∈ R such that y → F −1 (G(y)) is strictly convex on (y ⋆ , ∞).
The proof of Theorem 7 is given in Appendix A.8. The convexity of the function F −1 (G(x)) reflects the fact that the target distribution F is "fatter-tailed" than the distribution G. In other words, F is larger than G in the sense of transform convex order (Shaked and Shantikumar (2007) , p. 214).
Theorem 7 extends recent results by Dybvig and Wang (2012) in another direction. These authors show that if agent A has lower risk aversion than agent B, then agent A purchases a distribution that is larger than the other in the sense of SSD. Here, we show that the risk aversion of an agent is decreasing in available wealth if and only if the agent purchases a payoff that is heavier-tailed than the market variable H T .
Theorem 8. Consider an investor with optimal terminal wealth W T ∼ F . The investor has decreasing absolute risk aversion if and only if W T is increasing and strictly convex in H T .
The proof of Theorem 8 is given in Appendix A.9. Note that an investor with optimal terminal wealth W T ∼ F such that F has right-bounded support does not exhibit DARA. 13
The case of a Black-Scholes market
In a Black-Scholes market we find from (16) that H T is normally distributed, with mean rT + θ 2 T 2 and variance θ 2 T . It is then straightforward to compute
The financial market thus influences the risk aversion coefficient A(x) through the instantaneous Sharpe ratio θ = µ−r σ . Interestingly, the effect of the financial market on the risk aversion coefficient A(x) is proportional and does not depend on available wealth x. This also implies that in a Black-Scholes market, the properties of the function x → A(x) are solely related to distributional properties of final wealth and do not depend on particular market conditions. This observation is implicit in the following theorem.
Theorem 9 (DARA in a Black-Scholes market). Consider an investor who targets some cdf F for his terminal wealth. In a Black-Scholes market the investor has decreasing absolute risk aversion if and
or, equivalently,
where φ(·) and Φ(·) are the density and the cdf of a standard normal distribution.
The proof of this Theorem is given in Appendix A.10. When F is the distribution of a normal random variable, the ratio (28) becomes constant. This confirms the well-known fact that the demand for a normally distributed final wealth in a Black-Scholes market is tied to a constant absolute risk aversion (see Section 7.1 for a formal proof). In a Black-Scholes setting, the property of DARA remains invariant to changes in the financial market. This is, however, not true in a general market, where risk aversion, demand for a particular distribution and properties of the financial market are intertwined.
If the final wealth W has a lognormal distribution F , then one has F −1 (Φ(x)) = exp(x). Since the exponential function is clearly convex, Theorem 9 implies that, in a Black-Scholes market, the demand for a lognormal distribution corresponds to DARA preferences. One can also readily show that the exponential distribution also corresponds to DARA preferences in this setting. Effectively, from (29),
we only need to show that the survival function 1 − Φ(x) of a standard normal random variable is
. We need to show that k(x) cannot be strictly convex (x ∈ R). We proceed by contradiction, so let k(x) be strictly convex. This implies that it remains above its tangent. As it is non-constant and non-decreasing, there exists a point x for which the tangent has a positive slope and thus goes to infinity at infinity. It is thus impossible for k to be bounded from above. log-concave. 14 Consider for all x ∈ R such that F (x) < 1, the hazard function h(x) := f (x) 1−F (x) , which is a useful device for studying heavy-tailed properties of distributions. The hazard function for an exponentially distributed random variable rate function is clearly constant, so that a non-increasing hazard function reflects a distribution that is heavier-tailed than an exponentially distributed random variable. It is therefore intuitive that investors exhibiting a demand for distributions with a non-increasing hazard function exhibit DARA preferences. The following theorem makes this precise.
Theorem 10 (Sufficient conditions for DARA). Consider an investor who targets some cdf F for her terminal wealth. Denote its density by f . If the hazard function h(x) is non-increasing (resp. nonincreasing for x > k) or, equivalently, if 1 − F (x) is log-convex (resp. log-convex for x > k), then the investor has decreasing absolute risk aversion (resp. asymptotic DARA).
We remark from the proof (Appendix A.11) that a random variable with non-increasing hazard function h(x) must assume values that are almost surely in an interval [a, ∞) where a ∈ R. A lognormally distributed random variable thus has no non-increasing hazard function (but still satisfies the DARA property).
Distributions and Corresponding Utility Functions
We end this paper with a few examples illustrating the correspondence between the distribution of final wealth and the utility function.
Normal Distribution and Exponential Utility
Let F be the distribution of a normal random variable with mean M and variance Σ 2 . Then, from Theorem 2, the utility function explaining this distribution writes as
where a = exp
and θ = µ−r σ . This is essentially the form of an exponential utility function with constant absolute risk aversion
Note that the absolute risk aversion is constant and inversely proportional to the volatility Σ of the distribution. A higher volatility of the optimal distribution of final wealth corresponds to a lower absolute risk aversion. This is consistent with Dybvig and Wang (2012) , who show that lower risk aversion leads to a larger payoff in the sense of SSD. 15 Reciprocally, consider the following exponential 14 This is well-known in the literature and can be seen as a direct consequence of a more general result attributed to Prékopa (1973) , who shows that the differentiability and log-concavity of the density implies log-concavity of the corresponding distribution and survival function. It is clear that a normal density is log-concave and thus also its survival function.
15 In case of two normal distributions with equal mean, increasing SSD is equivalent to increasing variance.
utility function defined over R,
where γ is the risk aversion parameter and x ∈ R. This utility has constant absolute risk aversion A(x) = γ. The optimal wealth obtained with an initial budget X 0 is given by
where θ = µ−r σ is the instantaneous Sharpe ratio for the risky asset S, and thus X ⋆ T follows a normal distribution
Lognormal Distribution and CRRA and HARA Utilities
The HARA utility is a generalization of the CRRA utility and is given by
where a > 0, b + ax 1−γ > 0. For a given parametrization, this restriction puts a lower bound on x if γ < 1 and an upper bound on x when γ > 1. If −∞ < γ < 1, then this utility displays DARA. In the case γ → 1, the limiting case corresponds to a linear utility. In the case γ → 0, the utility function becomes logarithmic: U (x) = log(x + b). Its absolute risk aversion is
The optimal wealth obtained with an initial budget X 0 is given by
Observe that the optimal wealth for a HARA utility is a lognormal distribution translated by a constant term.
When b = 0, the HARA utility reduces to CRRA and the optimal wealth is LogNormal LN (M, Σ 2 ) over R + . We showed in Section 5 that the utility function explaining this distribution is a CRRA utility function. It has decreasing absolute risk aversion
where θ = µ − r σ .
Exponential Distribution
Consider an exponential distribution with cdf F (x) = 1 − e −λx where λ > 0. The utility function in (9) in Theorem 2 cannot be obtained in closed-form and does not correspond to a well-known utility. The coefficient of absolute risk aversion is given by
.
We have already shown that A(x) is decreasing and thus that the exponential distribution corresponds to a utility function exhibiting DARA.
Pareto Distribution
Consider a Pareto distribution with scale m > 0 and shape α > 0, defined on [m, +∞). Its pdf is
The coefficient of absolute risk aversion for x m is given by
Bergstrom and Bagnoli (2005) show that 1 − F (x) is log-convex. Theorem 10 thus implies that the Pareto distribution corresponds to DARA preferences.
Conclusions
Assuming investors' preferences satisfy FSD, our results can be used to non-parametrically estimate the utility function and the risk aversion of an investor, based solely on knowledge of the distribution of her final wealth (when optimally investing) and of the distribution of the pricing kernel (e.g., estimated in a non-parametric way, as per Aït-Sahalia and Lo (2001)). Another application consists in inferring the utility function that rationalizes optimal investment choice in non-expected utility frameworks (e.g., cumulative prospect theory or rank dependent utility theory).
Our results suggest inherent deficiencies in portfolio selection within a decision framework that satisfies FSD (equivalently with a law-invariant non-decreasing objective function). When the market exhibits a positive risk premium, Bernard, Boyle and Vanduffel (2014) show that for every put contract there exists a derivative contract that yields the same distribution at a strictly lower cost but without protection against a market crash. Then, the demand for standard put contracts can only be rationalized in a decision framework that violates FSD and in which background risk as a source of state-dependent preferences comes into play. Similarly, insurance contracts provide protection against certain losses and provide a payout when it is needed. For this reason, they often appear more valuable to customers than (cheaper) financial payoffs with the same distribution ). Thus, it would be useful to seek to develop decision frameworks in which FSD can be violated, for example considering ambiguity on the pricing kernel, Almost Stochastic Dominance (ASD) (Levy (2006) , chapter 13) or state-dependent preferences (Bernard, Boyle and Vanduffel (2014) , Chabi-Yo, Garcia and Renault (2008)).
A Appendix: Proofs of Theorems
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1 on page 5
Proof. Using the concavity of U (·), it is clear that for i ∈ {1, 2, ...N },
Thus for all x ∈ R, and i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N }, using (4) and (35),
Therefore, for all ω ∈ Ω, and terminal consumption X,
Since
(that is, all attainable consumption with the given budget X 0 ), after taking the expectation of (36),
. In other words, X * also solves (3).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1 on page 7 .
Assume that V (·) is non-decreasing and law-invariant and consider X and Y with respective distributions F X and F Y . Assume that X ≺ f sd Y . One has, for all x ∈ (0, 1), F −1
Y (x). Let U be a uniform random variable over (0, 1). Hence, F −1
and thus law invariance. Clearly, if X Y a. s. then X ≺ f sd Y and V (X) V (Y ).
A.3 Proof of Lemma 2 on page 8
Given ω ∈ Ω, consider the following auxiliary problem max y∈(a,b)
with λ ∈ R + . This is an optimization over the interval (a, b) of a concave function. The first-order conditions imply that the optimum y * is at U ′ (y) − λξ T (ω) = 0, i.e., y * = [ 
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3 on page 10
(vi) and (vii) are equivalent because of Theorem 1. Given that X T has distribution F , we have that (ii), (iii), (iv) and (v) are equivalent as a consequence of Lemma 1 and of the earlier work of Dybvig (1988a Dybvig ( , 1988b and on cost-efficiency. In addition, it has already been noted that a solution to (6) must be cost-efficient (Lemma 1). Thus (vi) or (vii) implies (ii) From Theorem 2, it is clear that a cost-efficient payoff is the solution to an expected utility maximization (so (ii) implies (i)).
Finally observe that if X T is rationalizable by the standard expected utility maximization then (vii) also holds true (so (i) implies (vii)). We have proved that the seven first statements are equivalent.
Let's prove the equivalence with (viii). Assume (viii) and observe that if V (·) satisfies SSD 16 then V (·) satisfies also FSD 17 , thus (viii) implies (vi). We have also proved that (vi) is equivalent to (i). But then (i) implies (viii) because X → V (X) := E[u(X)] where u is concave in U (a,b) satisfies SSD.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 3 on page 12
Take U ∈ U (a,b) (Definition 3). Note that U (x) is concave and strictly increasing and (a, b) ⊂ R, which implies that U (x) is continuous and strictly increasing on (a, b), Hence, the left and right derivatives of U exist at each point of (a, b) and are equal to each other, except in a countable number of points where U is not differentiable; see also Proposition 17, Chapter 5, Section 5 of Royden (1988) ). We can then conclude that U ′ is left-continuous and decreasing on (a, ∞) with discontinuities in a set (x i ) i∈I with x i ∈ (a, b] and I ⊂ N (note that b can also be a point of non-differentiability). There is also a countable number of non-empty open intervals of R on which U ′ is constant (they are disjoint open intervals of R and thus countable). Define {y i } i∈J the countable set of values taken by U ′ on these intervals (with J ⊂ N). Let λ > 0 and define
P (A) = 0 as it is a countable union of sets, each with zero probability (given that ξ T is continuously distributed).
The proof consists further of three steps:
Step 1: Given λ > 0 and ω ∈ Ω\A, we show below that the a.s. unique optimum of
(λξ T (ω)) ∈ R, where the inverse of U ′ is defined by (13),
Step 2: The a.s. optimum of
is then also equal to Y ⋆ λ (ω) too because
, and ∀z < a, U (z) − λξ T (ω)z = −∞ and λ > 0.
Step 3: If there exists λ > 0 such that the pathwise optimum Y ⋆ λ satisfies the budget constraint
solves Problem (12) (note that P (A) = 0). The existence of λ is guaranteed thanks to the budget constraint
, the property that the cost as a function of λ is continuous on (0, ∞), and the facts that if λ → +∞ the limit of the pseudo inverse of the left derivative is a and that if λ → 0, the limit of the pseudo inverse of the left derivative is b.
To complete the proof of Lemma 3, the only remaining step to prove is Step 1. For λ > 0, we have that λξ T (ω) > 0. Denote by
is defined in (13). Specifically it is U ′ −1
Thus, x * ∈ R in all cases. Let us prove that x * is an optimum. As U ′ is left-continuous, U ′ (x * ) λξ T (ω) and we consider the following two cases:
where we use the concavity of U (x) (specifically, the fact that the slope
is larger than
. For x ∈ (x * , b), using the concavity of U (x) again, we have that
For all x ∈ (a, b) we have proved that
The same inequality also holds for x = a and x = b (we take take limits if a = −∞ or b = ∞)
Case 2: U ′ (x * ) > λξ T (ω). This implies that x * is at some point of non-differentiability x i , x * = x i , and the left derivative of U in x i is strictly larger than its right derivative, which we denote by a
i . Observe that when a < x < x i , by concavity of U (x),
When b > x > x i , using the concavity of U (x) again,
For all x ∈ (a, b), and thus for all x ∈ [a, b], we have proved that U (
We can thus conclude that x * is an optimum. It is also unique unless U (y) − λξ T (ω) is flat at x * , but by assumption ω ∈ Ω\A and thus the slope of y → U (y) − λξ T (ω)y can never be 0 on an interval that is not reduced to a point. This ends the proof of Step 1 and thus Lemma 3 is proved.
A.6 Proof of Theorem 4 on page 12.
First step: Verify that U in (14) belongs to U (a,b) for some real numbers a and b.
Define a = inf{x | F (x) > 0} and b = sup{x | F (x) < 1}. Let us prove that U ∈ U (a,b) .
Observe that F ξ T (1 − F (y)) > 0 for all y ∈ (a, b) (because ξ T is continuously distributed) and thus U is strictly increasing on (a, b). Its left derivative for y ∈ (a, b) is given by
It is clear that it is non-increasing on (a, b) and thus U is concave on (a, b). U (a) and U (b) are welldefined (potentially inR).
Since F (y) = inf x ∈ (a, b) | F (x) 1 − F ξ T (y) = F −1 (1 − F ξ T (y)).
where 0 < 1 − F ξ T (y) < 1 because ξ T has a positive density over positive real numbers and y > 0.
Thus
For λ * = 1, X ⋆ T has the distribution F and the right cost X 0 . We have thus proved the existence and the form of the generalized utility function that explains the demand for F .
Third step: Uniqueness of U . Assume that there exists a 2 and b 2 and another generalized utility U 2 ∈ U (a 2 ,b 2 ) such that the optimum has distribution F . From Lemma 1, there is a unique cost-efficient payoff with cdf F (i.e., it is given as F −1 (1 − F ξ T (ξ T ))). From Lemma 3, there is a unique optimum for a given generalized utility U 2 for the generalized expected utility maximization given by U ′ 2 −1 (λ * ξ T ), so we get that
Thus,
We must have a = a 2 , otherwise, one would be finite while the other side is infinite. We must also have b = b 2 , otherwise, one would be 0 while the other one is positive. Finally, two continuous functions with the same left derivatives at any point on (a, b) must be equal up to a linear transformation. The uniqueness of the generalized utility is thus proved.
A.7 Proof of Theorem 6 on page 16
Observe that F −1 ξ T (y) = exp(−G −1 (1 − y)) so that using the expression for U obtained in (9),
and (F (x)) ) .
The stated expression for the absolute risk aversion coefficient A(x) is then obtained, as A(x) = − U ′′ (x) U ′ (x) . It is well-defined when F (x) ∈ (0, 1) because g(x) > 0 for all x ∈ R and G −1 exists on (0, 1). The expression for the relative risk aversion coefficient R(x) follows immediately.
A.8 Proof of Theorem 7 on page 16
Denote by F the domain where A(x) is well-defined. To assess the DARA property, we study when ln(A(x)) is strictly decreasing for x ∈ F. For all x ∈ F, it is clear that x → ln(A(x)) is decreasing if and only if p → ln(A(F −1 (p))) is decreasing on (0, 1). Using expression (26) for A(x) for x ∈ F, and differentiating with respect to p, one has that the derivative is negative if and only if for p ∈ (0, 1),
Consider next the auxiliary function y → F −1 (G(y)) defined on R. By twice differentiating and using the substitution q = G(y), one finds that it is strictly convex if and only if for q ∈ (0, 1),
Since (41) and (42) are the same, this last step ends the proof.
A.9 Proof of Theorem 8 on page 17
Assume that the investor has the DARA property. Consider the variable Y T = F −1 (G(H T ))) and observe that Y T ∼ F (because G(H T ) ∼ U (0, 1)). Since k(x) := F −1 (G(x)) is strictly convex and increasing, we only need to prove that Y T = W T (a.s.). Y T is non-increasing in ξ T and thus cost-efficient.
It is thus the a.s. unique cost-efficient payoff distributed with F . Since W T is also cost-efficient and distributed with F it follows that Y T = W T (a.s.). Conversely, if W T = k(H T ) then k(x) = F −1 (G(x)) must hold where F is the distribution function of W T (W T is cost-efficient). Since k(x) is strictly convex the DARA property holds (Theorem 7).
A.10 Proof of Theorem 9 on page 17
Since G(x) is the distribution function of a normally distributed random variable, it is straightforward that A(x) is decreasing if and only if (28) holds true. Furthermore, F −1 (G(x)) is strictly convex if and only if F −1 (Φ(x)) is strictly convex. The second part of the theorem now follows from Theorem 7.
A.11 Proof of Theorem 10 on page 18
Proof. Denote by J(x) = 1 − e −λx the distribution of an exponentially distributed random variable.
Since F −1 (Φ(x)) = F −1 (J(J −1 (Φ(x)))) and J −1 (Φ(x)) is strictly convex (because the exponential distribution corresponds to DARA: see footnote 14) and strictly increasing, it is sufficient to show that F −1 (J(x)) is strictly increasing and convex on R + \{0}. Since h(x) is non-increasing, it follows that F must have support in the form [a, ∞) for some a ∈ R so that F is strictly increasing on [a, ∞). This implies that F −1 (J(x)) is strictly increasing on R + \{0}. Observe next that log(1 − F (x)) = −λk(x)
where k(x) := H −1 (F (x)). Since log(1− F (x)) is convex and decreasing, k(x) is concave and increasing i.e., k ′ (x) > 0 and k ′′ (x) < 0. Straight-forward differentiation yields that k −1 (x) = F −1 (H(x)) is convex, which ends the proof.
